Configurable quantitative channel-breakout Expert Advisor for MetaTrader 5 with centralized account risk controls.
- MQL5 100%
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6408907b92
Defect A - shared guard deletion and first-creation race: - The shared V2 guard is now a persistent coordination object. It is never deleted after creation; release and rollback are both a compare-and-swap back to the exact unclaimed sentinel (0.0), so a contender that acquires the guard between an owner's CAS and its cleanup keeps its claim. - First creation is fenced by ballots: the contender announces its own ballot, scans for live foreign ballots, re-reads the guard AFTER the scan (a stale observation of absence is never used), verifies the sentinel it wrote, claims it by CAS and re-scans afterwards. A rival found at any point fails the claim closed and the guard is given back with a CAS to the sentinel - never deleted, never overwritten. - The owner's ballot stays visible for as long as it owns the guard and is renewed by the heartbeat; only a contender's own ballot is ever removed, and only after it no longer owns the guard. - UQ_GUARD_UNCLAIMED is a distinct protocol state, accepted for the V2 guard namespace only. The legacy guard namespace keeps zero as corrupt evidence, and negative, fractional, non-finite and future values stay invalid everywhere. - Ownership loss is latched for the lifetime of the guard object. Defect B - ownership loss must stop persistence: - CUQInstanceGuard implements CUQOwnershipVerifier: a read-only proof that the guard still carries this instance's value and is still inside the TTL. - CUQRisk binds that verifier after the guard is acquired and before Init(), and refuses to initialize without one. - A persistence boundary inside CUQRisk gates the primary write, the backup write, the staging write, legacy migration, V2 marker creation, marker restoration, marker removal and reservation reconciliation. Any failure latches the loss: the controller is unhealthy, entries are blocked, and no retry or reacquisition is possible in that instance. - UQStateSave() takes the verifier and fences its three file mutations individually, so a loss proven before the primary commit cannot write it. EA event ordering: - OnTick() and OnTimer() verify ownership before risk evaluation, lock servicing, trailing and symbol processing. - OnTradeTransaction() does not invoke persistence-capable reservation reconciliation after the loss. - OnDeinit() releases only a guard this instance provably still holds. - Heartbeats are throttled; every event performs the read-only proof, so a two second timer is not the only discovery path. Input semantics: - InpPreventDuplicateInstances is deprecated and reserved. Exclusive persistence ownership is unconditional, and an ownership loss always blocks entries, so the input has no effect. It is kept so existing .set files keep loading, and a runtime note reports that it is ignored. Preserved unchanged: V2 fingerprint and file locators, legacy identity hash and key, legacy ambiguity refusal, risk limits and strategy logic. |
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| Include | ||
| .gitignore | ||
| Universal_Quant_EA.mq5 | ||